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THE UTILIZATION OF EYETRACKING TO UNDERSTAND ATTENTION 
SWITCHING IN SOCIALLY ANXIOUS AND DEPRESSED INDIVIDUALS 
ALLISON E. GRIESMER 
ABSTRACT 
 Individuals with social anxiety disorder (SAD) and major depressive disorder 
(MDD) have demonstrated differences in attention bias processing, leading to a 
differential processing of the world around them. As such, there is a pressing need to 
further understand these hypothesized attentional biases to lend to improved therapeutic 
deliveries. The present study utilized a novel eye-tracking paradigm to understand 
attentional biases in individuals with disorder-specific symptomology of SAD and MDD. 
A sample of 103 undergraduates completed measures of social anxiety, depression and a 
novel eye-tracking paradigm. Results showed that a combination of elevated SAD and 
MDD symptoms lends to a slower disengagement time from negative stimuli when 
compared to healthy control participants, regardless of negatively valenced stimuli (sad 
or disgust face). Contrary to expectation, individuals with elevated MDD symptoms did 
not demonstrate an overall difference in disengagement practices when compared to 
control participants. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
      Major depressive disorder (MDD) and social anxiety disorder (SAD) are 
common, highly comorbid, and debilitating in nature. Independent lifetime prevalence 
rates of both disorders range from 13%-16%, with 37% of those diagnosed with one 
disorder evidencing clinical threshold of the other (Kessler, 2012). These high 
comorbidity rates are surpassed only by the personal and societal costs associated with 
the two disorders, which exceed 44.4 billion dollars annually in the United States 
(Collins, Westra, Dozois, & Burns, 2004). Given that anxiety disorders often precede the 
onset of MDD (Dalrymple & Zimmermann, 2011), identifying specific mechanisms that 
presage the onset of each disorder may inform prevention efforts, and perhaps reduce the 
risk of their sequelae.  
 Traditional models of both disorders point to disrupted attention processes as 
potential mechanisms for both disorders, with difficulties disengaging from emotion-
congruent information linked to each (Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Gotlib & 
Joormann, 2010; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, and Joorman, 2013). Specifically
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anxiety is believed to be linked to threat-appraisal in both the early stage of attention 
(Mathews & MacLeod 1994; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), coupled with 
downstream cognitive processing of social stressors (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016), 
while depression is associated with voluntary attentional bias towards dysphoric stimuli 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Emergent literature points to difficulty in attention 
shifting away from dysphoric stimuli as specific to depression (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; 
Donaldson, Lam, Mathews, 2007; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2003). 
 Empirical findings have been mixed with respect to the role of attention biases in 
the two disorders, with some supporting the above noted pattern of attention processing 
(Bradley, Mogg, Millar, & White, 1995; Holas, Krejtz, Cypryanska & Nezlek, 2014; 
Joorman & D’Avanato, 2010; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005; Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mackintosh & Mathews, 2003; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Mogg, Millar & Bradley, 
2000; Perez, Baños, Ruipérez & Belloch, 1999; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003; Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001), and other failing to note such distinctions (Gotlib et al., 2004; LeMoult, 
Yoon, & Joormann, 2012; Kirkanski, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2014). Such mixed results 
may, in part, stem from the use of behavioral measures of attention that are confounded 
with motor activity in their measurement of attention responses. Efforts to overcome such 
limitations have employed eye tracking methodologies that do not require motor 
movement to ascertain indices of visual attention. However, these efforts have largely 
revolved around studying bias during naturalistic viewing paradigms, such as Stroop 
tasks or dot-probe tasks, in which participants’ attention preferences are measured. Thus, 
it remains unclear whether SAD and MDD evidence differential patterns in disengaging 
attention away from disorder-specific stimuli.   
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 The present study aims to overcome the above noted limitations in the literature 
by examining attention disengagement to disorder-specific stimuli as a mechanism for 
understanding attention biases for SAD versus MDD. In the sections below, further 
information on each disorder is provided, and a rational for the hypothesized disorder-
specific attention deficits is discussed. 
1.1 Major Depressive and Social Anxiety Disorder 
Major Depressive Disorder is characterized by both anhedonia and sustained 
sadness, and is one of the most common mental health disorders in the United States. 
Over a one-year period, an estimated 15.7 million adults living in the United States 
suffered from at least one episode of MDD (Kessler et al., 2005). The median onset age 
for MDD is 32 years old, with prevalence rates between 20-26% for women and 8-12% 
for their male counterparts (Journal of the American Medical Association, 1996). The 
onset of depression demonstrates a chronic course, however, improvement of symptoms 
after four to six weeks of psychotherapy are above 80% (National Institute of Health, 
1998).  
Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) is characterized by an excessive fear of social or 
performance situations in which the individual is concerned or embarrassed about 
performing inadequately or displaying visible anxiety symptoms in front of others. This 
disorder is one of the most common and chronic forms of anxiety disorders (Kircanski, 
Joormann, Gotlib, 2015), affecting 13% of the US population during their lifetime 
(Belzer, McKee, & Liebowitz, 2005; Kessler, 2013), and 7% within a given year (Kessler 
et al., 2005). SAD is the fourth most common psychological disorder worldwide (Kessler, 
2005; Weeks, Howell, & Goldin, 2013).  Unlike MDD, SAD demonstrates an 
adolescence onset, and exhibits a chronic course, with recovery falling below a 40% rate 
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over a decade follow-up period (Bruce et al., 2005; Kircanski, Joorman, & Gotlib, 2014). 
Indeed, estimates suggest that over one-third of those with SAD wait over 10 years 
before seeking treatment (Kaufman & Baucom, 2014), which speaks to the chronic 
course of the disorder. 
1.2 Models of Major Depression and Social Anxiety Disorders 
Major Depression Disorder. Cognitive models of MDD propose that depression 
is caused and maintained by biases in the processing of emotional information (Beck, 
1979; Bower, 1981; Sanchez et al., 2013; Teasdale, 1988). Beck (1976) postulated that 
existing memory representations, or schemas, lead individuals to filter stimuli from the 
environment such that their attention is directed toward information that is congruent 
with their schemas.  Beck (1976) further theorized that the schemas of depressed persons 
include themes of loss, separation, failure, worthlessness, and rejection; consequently, 
depressed individuals will exhibit a systematic bias in their processing of environmental 
stimuli or information that is relevant to these themes. Because of this bias, depressed 
people attend selectively to negative stimuli in their environment and interpret neutral 
and ambiguous stimuli in a schema-congruent way (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Moreover, dysfunctional schemas and processing biases are presumed to endure beyond 
the depressive episode, representing stable vulnerability factors for depression onset and 
recurrence. When the dysfunctional schemas are activated by stressors, specific negative 
cognitions are generated that take the form of automatic thoughts and revolve around 
pessimistic views about the self, the world, and the future (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). 
Thus, governed by these dysfunctional schemas, a depression-prone individual 
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selectively attends to mood congruent information that maintains their dysphoric states 
that progress into the clinical manifestation of the disorder. 
In regards to disengagement practices, Koster, Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De 
Raedt (2011) propose the impaired disengagement hypothesis as a means to explain 
disengagement practices among individuals with high depressive symptomology. This 
hypothesis posits that the prolonged processing of self-referent material is due to 
impaired attentional disengagement from negative self-referent information (Koster, 
Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 2011), which can account for prolonged 
disengagement time among individuals with high depressive symptoms. As such, when 
depressed individuals are exposed to mood-congruent, negative stimuli, such as sad faces, 
extended disengagement time are observed (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakhshan, & De Raedt, 
2011). This extension of disengagement time is hypothesized to be a result of individuals 
demonstrating a difficulty to exercise attentional control in response to negative thoughts, 
thus likely experiencing persistent rumination.  
Difficulties disengaging from negative stimuli may preclude depressed 
individuals from utilizing effective emotion regulation strategies such as distraction when 
confronted with stressful events, resulting in sustained processing of negative 
information, which can lead to prolonged negative affect (Sanchez et al., 2013). 
Additionally, these attentional bias may interfere with an individual’s ability to reframe 
the presented negative stimuli through stimuli reappraisal (Sanchez et al., 2013). 
Difficulties with attentional disengagement may contribute to rumination of negatively 
valenced stimuli (Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & De Raedt, 2011).  
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Social Anxiety Disorder. Cognitive theories of SAD posit that the main process of 
SAD is self-directed attention triggered by social situations, with a corresponding 
withdrawal of adaptive attention to positive external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997). Models of SAD (Clark & Wells, 1995) predict that information 
processing biases play a role in the maintenance of the disorder’s psychopathology. 
Current evidence suggests that SAD increases attentional threat biases. Studies have 
supported this assumption by showing that individuals with a high level of social anxiety 
tend to display an attentional bias towards external threats, and a greater likelihood of 
favoring the threatening meaning of ambiguous cues (Peschard & Philippot, 2015). 
Furthermore, Rapee and Heimberg’s (1997) theory posits that individuals with SAD 
come to view the world as a harsh and critical place, and consequently conduct their lives 
as though they are under the constant scrutiny of others. Socially anxious individuals are 
said to generate and attend to a negative self-impression based on their prior beliefs, 
feelings, and self-image. Subsequent self-evaluation of social performance is then driven 
by this negative self-impression, rather than by external feedback from others (Abbott & 
Rapee, 2004).  
 As previously noted, attention bias to threat (e.g., disgust faces) is a cognitive 
vulnerability factor for social anxiety that occurs in the early stages of information 
processing (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016). The utilization of disgust faces for 
threatening stimuli derives from the idea that socially anxious individuals scan their 
environment for feedback from their peers (Peschard & Philippot, 2015). Thus, a “disgust 
face”, which is indicative of negative social feedback, would be viewed by someone with 
social anxiety as threatening.  Individuals with elevated levels of SAD tend to exhibit 
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longer time to engage with threatening stimuli, but also exhibit late stage cognitive 
processing following the presentation of threatening stimuli, thus leading to longer 
disengagement times. By understanding engagement and disengagement practices of 
socially anxious individuals with regards to threatening stimuli, the etiology, 
maintenance, and treatment of SAD can be improved upon. Schofield et al. (2012) have 
investigated disengagement practices among socially anxious individuals, concluding that 
people with high levels of social anxiety were in fact slower to divert their attention away 
from disgust stimuli.  
 Additionally, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) propose that post-event 
processing (PEP) is associated with disengagement practices among socially anxious 
individuals. PEP refers to repeated thinking about and reevaluation of the negative 
aspects of one’s performance after a social situation (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016), 
which is crucially important when considering cognitive vulnerability and maintenance 
factors of social anxiety symptoms.  Thus, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) posit that 
when individuals are experiencing high levels of social anxiety, they will take longer to 
disengage due to their attention to and subsequent dwelling on the presented stimuli. In a 
study conducted by Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, (2016), participants were exposed to 
stimuli of happy, sad, disgust, and neutral faces and disengagement practices were 
observed using an eye-tracker with the goal of understanding attentional biases with 
disgust stimuli in socially anxious participants. Overall, Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano 
(2016) determined that individuals with elevated levels of social anxiety demonstrated 
longer disengagement times along with longer PEP times. This novel finding by Çek, 
Sanchez, & Timpano (2016) elucidates the idea that socially anxious people dwell, and 
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take longer to process, presented threatening stimuli, thus demonstrating difficulty 
diverting their attention away from the presented threat.  
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CHAPTER II 
ATTENTIONAL BIASES 
 
 
It is well established that the scope of attentional focus is limited, that there can be 
only one focus of attention at a given time, and that only information selected to be 
attended to undergoes extensive processing (Sears et al., 2010).  Attention functions via 
selecting relevant stimuli in the environment for further scrutiny (Lavie et al., 2004). 
Because of this, when multiple sources of information compete for visual attention, an 
individual must prioritize visual allocation by shifting the focus of their attention from 
one source to another (Sears et al., 2010). Researchers studying selective attention in 
clinical populations have discovered attentional biases in the allocation of attentional 
foci, such that concern-related or mood-congruent material is given priority (Sears et al., 
2010).   
Attention biases in depression and social anxiety have largely been examined with 
respect to selective attention engagement (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012), which reflects 
preferential attention allocation towards or away from a given stimulus. Attention biases 
may also reflect difficulty switching, or disengaging attention away from valenced 
stimuli, which somewhat reflects a capture of attention processes (Armstrong & 
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Olantunji, 2012).  While there is some evidence for attention bias in both MDD and SAD, 
cognitive theories predict differential attentional deficits across the two disorders. 
2.1 Attention Bias in Major Depressive Disorder 
As previously noted, cognitive theories of depression posit that depression risk 
stems, in part, from negative information processing that is governed by, and filtered 
through, negative self-schemas (e.g., Beck 1979, 1987). This information processing 
involves biased allocation of attention, which reflects directed attention towards schema-
congruent information in the environment (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1997).  
Despite a clear theoretical basis for biased attention processing in depression, 
empirical findings on such biases in depression have been mixed.  For example, Beck's 
(1976) model predicts that depression should be associated with an attentional bias for 
mood-congruent stimuli. Thus, mood-congruent interference effects should be present for 
depressed populations when compared with controls, which could be measured via the 
Stroop task (Mathews & MacLeod, 1986).  The Stroop task asks participants to look at 
color words and proceed to read them aloud. Interestingly, the names of the color (i.e.: 
“red”) is printed in a different color ink, such as blue. The “Stroop effect” is then 
observed, as participants will sometimes state the color of the printed word while 
disregarding the actual word that is printed. The “Stroop effect” is observed differently in 
individuals with disorder-specific symptomology. Research has shown that depressed 
populations exhibit inconsistent depression-related Stroop effects and strong memory 
biases (Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Mineka, Watson, & Clark, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 2005; Williams et al., 1988). For instance, while some have 
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observed slower word and color naming performance on the Stroop among depressed 
participants, presumably indicating greater attention interference (Kertzman et al., 2010), 
others found that depressed individuals outperformed their non-depressed peers 
(Markela-Lerenc et al., 2006) in color-naming words.    
Similar mixed findings were observed using the visual dot probe paradigm that 
examines biased attention allocation by priming the participants with a dot to the location 
of valenced and non-valenced words or faces in the visual field (Fritzsche et al., 2010; 
Gotlib et al, 2004a, b; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986; Mogg et al., 1995; Rinck & 
Becker, 2005). For example, in a series of studies, Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib, Kasch, 
et al., 2004; Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007) found 
clinically depressed participants exhibit an attentional bias toward sad faces. These 
findings were independently replicated by Fritzsche et al. (2010), who confirmed an 
attention bias towards sad faces and a bias away from happy faces among individuals 
who were in the middle of a depression episode. In contrast, others failed to show 
attentional biases among depressed participants who were exposed to negatively valenced 
words (Rinck & Becker, 2005) or faces (Mogg et al., 1995).  
There is a surprising dearth of work that examines biased attention switching in 
depressed participants. Attention switching can be defined as one’s ability to visually 
engage with specific stimuli, then diverting your visual attention to another presented 
stimulus in the same visual field. Although most emotional stimuli could initially draw 
our attentional focus, it is adaptive for people to shift away from that information if it 
poses no immediate relevance. Here, individuals will shift their attention elsewhere, as it 
would be maladaptive for a person to continue focusing on certain information 
  12 
(particularly negative information) that no longer holds value.  However, individuals with 
mood disorders, such as MDD or SAD, tend to perseverate on negative stimuli, which 
could be reflected in attentional inflexibility in response to disorder-specific inputs (such 
as disgust or sad faces).  
 The disengagement, or lack thereof, from negative stimuli can be framed in terms 
of attention switching processes.  Due to certain cognitive mechanisms underlying these 
disorders, such as rumination in MDD or post-even processing (PEP) in SAD, 
disengagement from negative stimuli becomes a challenging task. Overall, individuals are 
less able to divert their attention from stimuli that is resonating with their symptomology. 
Attention switching is important when attempting to understand how depressed 
individuals interpret social interactions, thus impacting how these individuals regulate 
their emotions (Sanchez, Romero, & De Raedt, 2017). While some researchers have 
found that depressed individuals are characterized by deficits in emotional processing 
(Carton et al., 1999; Rubinow & Post, 1992), other researchers have independently failed 
to replicate these findings (Ridout et al., 2009). Such inconsistent results may in part be 
attributed to the use of low intensity stimuli, such as negatively valenced words, that may 
be insufficient to evoke adequate attention capture among depressed individuals. Indeed, 
the use of negative valenced faces has been shown to more robustly evoke attention 
biases among depressed persons (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010), that may in turn be 
evidenced in their difficulty disengaging from negatively valenced information (De Raedt 
& Koster, 2010; Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010).  
Sanchez et al., (2013)’s approach to understanding shifting biases in MDD 
participants consisted of presenting stimuli that comprised emotional (happy, sad, and 
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disgust) and neutral facial expressions of the same person. These facial expression 
pictures were selected from the Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces database 
(Lundqvisk, Flykt, & Öhman, 1998). Each trial started with a black screen for 500 ms, 
followed by the display of a white fixation cross in the middle of a black screen for 500 
ms. A white random 1-digit number (ranging from 1 to 9) replaced the fixation cross, 
appearing in the center for 1,000 ms. Participants were instructed to fixate on the number 
and say it aloud as quickly as possible. Immediately after the offset of the 1-digit number, 
a pair of faces (either happy-neutral, angry-neutral, or sad-neutral) was presented for 
3,000 ms and participants were told to freely watch the screen without constraints. 
Fixation data was recorded with the eye-tracker during the 3,000 ms period and was used 
to estimate three indices of naturalistic processing employed in previous research: initial 
orientation, fixation frequency, and fixation time (Sanchez et al., 2013). Results showed 
that dysphoric and depressed participants evidenced difficulty disengaging visual 
attention away from sad faces (Sanchez et al., 2013). Given these slower disengagement 
times from sad faces in depressed and dysphoric participants, this proposes that mood-
congruent stimuli impacts visual attention. Specifically, Sanchez et al.’s (2013) study 
confirms that depression is associated with difficulties disengaging attention from 
depression-related stimuli, such as sad faces. The depressed participants were slower to 
disengage from sad faces relative to control group participants, while the control group 
did not demonstrate attentional engagements or disengagements difficulties from other 
emotional stimuli, (i.e., angry faces, happy faces) (Sanchez et al., 2013). Specifically, 
depressed participants demonstrated an overall slower disengagement from sad stimuli 
when compared to the control groups. These difficulties disengaging could be 
  14 
representative of deficits in inhibitory control, resulting in the prolonged processing of 
negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented visual information, hindering recovery from 
negative moods and leading to an overall sustained negative affect within the depressive 
episode (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010; Sanchez et al., 2013)  This novel methodology to 
attention bias in depressed individuals is thought to be associated with a lack of inhibitory 
control over negative information and with the use of maladaptive emotion regulation 
strategies, which would result in sustained negative affect (Sanchez, Romero, & De 
Raedt, 2017). 
Sanchez et al.’s (2013) study sought to understand if depressed individuals took 
longer to disengage from mood-congruent stimuli as a result of prolonged processing of 
negative stimuli. This difficulty in disengaging could be a result of deficits in inhibitory 
control (Sanchez et al., 2013). Malfunctioning inhibition of irrelevant negative stimuli 
could result in prolonged processing of negative, goal-irrelevant aspects of presented 
information and thereby hindering recovery from negative mood and leading to the 
sustained negative affect that characterizes depressive episodes (Sanchez et al., 2013; 
Gotlib & Joorman, 2010).  
In summary, there is mixed evidence to suggest that depression is associated with 
biased attention towards mood-congruent stimuli, such as sadness (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010; Sanchez et al., 2013), and not in response to threat (Williams et al., 1988). Further, 
emerging evidence using eye tracking methods suggests that depression is linked to 
deficits in the capacity to disengage attention from sadness-related material, due to a 
deficit in inhibitory controls of cognitive processing.  
2.2 Attention Bias in Social Anxiety Disorder 
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As previously noted, cognitive theories of social anxiety posit that social anxiety 
risk stems, in part, from preferentially attending to socially threatening information and 
thus exhibits enhanced memory for presented information. Accordingly, SAD is 
associated with quick detection and immediate attention to relevant stimuli, even when 
stimuli are presented subliminally (LeMoult, Yoon, & Joormann, 2012b). 
Despite a clear theoretical basis for biased attention in social anxiety disorder, 
empirical findings on such biases in SAD are mixed. For example, while, as expected, 
socially threatening information has been shown to interfere in processing non-
threatening information for socially anxious individuals on the Stroop task (Mogg et al., 
1995), others showed that anxious individuals process information slower than their 
anxiety-free peers irrespective of whether the information is socially threatening (Mattia, 
Heimberg, & Hope, 1992). Similar mixed findings were noted though the utilization of 
the dot probe paradigm (Fritzsche et al., 2010; Gotlib et al, 2004a, b; MacLeod, Mathews, 
& Tata, 1986; Mogg et al., 1995; Rinck & Becker, 2005). For example, while Helfinstein, 
White, Bar-Haim & Fox (2008) demonstrated that socially anxious individuals were 
biased towards threatening stimuli, Mansell et al. (1999) and Bradley et al. (1995) 
deduced that in the absence of social-evaluative threat, high and low socially anxious 
individuals did not differ in their attention to facial expressions. In a similar fashion, 
Klumpp & Amir (2009) demonstrated an attentional bias with socially anxious 
individuals and threatening stimuli, but only when the threatening stimuli were in the 
bottom half of the computer monitor, thus calling into question if threatening stimuli need 
to be placed in a specific location on a computer monitor to trigger an attentional bias. 
Additionally, Weeks, Howell & Goldin (2013) found that regardless of positive or 
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negative stimuli presented to social anxious individuals, eye contact was significantly 
decreased when compared to their control counterparts.   
As previously noted, attention bias to threat (e.g., disgust faces) is a cognitive 
vulnerability factor for social anxiety that occurs in the early stages of information 
processing (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016). Individuals with elevated levels of SAD 
tend to exhibit elongated engagement towards threatening stimuli, but have also exhibited 
late stage cognitive process following the presentation of threatening stimuli. This mixed 
evidence with socially anxious individuals posits that individuals with SAD will 
demonstrate greater disengagement times when presented with threat-congruent stimuli.  
As in the case of studies that examine attention bias in depression, some of these 
mixed findings may stem from the use of low intensity stimuli, such as words, versus 
stimuli that better capture salient threat information such as facial expressions (Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997).  
In summary, there is mixed evidence to suggest that anxious individuals both 
support biased attention towards threatening (i.e.: disgust) stimuli (Weeks, Howell, & 
Goldin, 2013; Schofield et al., 2012), and will demonstrate difficulty shifting away from 
these stimuli once they are detected (Çek, Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016; Schofield, 2012, 
Sanchez et al., 2013, 2016). 
2.3 Are biased attention allocation and disengagement difficulties disorder-specific risk 
factors? 
While literature on MDD and SAD suggests unique patterns of attention biases 
and between the two disorders, there is a surprising dearth of work that examines such 
biases in samples that show characteristics of both disorders. Selective processing of 
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threatening stimuli (i.e.: disgust faces) at early stages of visual presentation appears to be 
more characteristic to individuals with SAD, whereas individuals with MDD are instead 
associated with selective attention to mood-congruent stimuli (i.e.: sad faces) (Çek, 
Sanchez, & Timpano, 2016; Mathews & MacLeod, 2005). Visual attention studies have 
evidenced that a robust orientation bias toward threatening stimuli was evident in studies 
that examine SAD, while MDD studies concluded a lack of orientation bias toward 
threatening stimuli (Sears et al., 2011).  
While advances have been made in the area of attention bias in SAD and MDD, 
notable methodological limitations are also evident. Until recently, studies that examine 
attention bias in both disorders have relied on behavioral measures such as the Stroop and 
Dot Probe tasks that require participant to press a keyboard button or to verbalize a 
response to detect attention. Such measures of attention reflect a mixture attention 
processes and individual differences in motor response that obscure the role of attention 
in SAD and MDD.  
Studies that employ eye-tracking methods that directly and continuously measure 
overt visual attention are largely unhindered by the inherent limitations of behavioral 
reaction time measures (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012). This is because eye movements 
are less susceptible to confounding processes of motor behavior, and allow the 
continuous recording of attention unlike behavioral Stroop tasks and Dot-Probe tasks 
(Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012).  However, eye tracking studies have largely examined 
biased attention engagement, rather than the deficits in attention disengagement among 
depressed and socially anxious participants (Armstrong & Olantunji, 2012; Weeks, 
Howell, & Goldin, 2013; Kulke, Atkinson, & Braddick, 2015), because procedure for 
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detecting biases in attention shifts were unavailable. Recent work by Sanchez (2013) has 
provided one means of measuring visual attention shifting that may shed light on 
attention shifting biases related to SAD and MDD.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE CURRENT STUDY 
 
 
The current study examined the role of attentional biases in risk for MDD and 
SAD and their co-occurrence using novel methodology developed by Sanchez and 
colleagues (Sanchez et al., 2013).  It was hypothesized that those with elevated MDD 
symptoms and low SAD symptoms would show a difficulty disengaging from sad to 
neutral faces. Similarly, it was hypothesized that individuals with elevated SAD and low 
MDD symptoms would demonstrate slower disengagement times from disgust faces. It 
was hypothesized that those with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD would evidence 
the greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both stimulus types, as cognitive 
theories of both MDD and SAD support the presentation of mood-congruent stimuli (sad 
and disgust faces) would lend to a longer disengagement period.  
3.1 Hypotheses 
     H1: Individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms will show a 
difficulty disengaging from sad to neutral faces.  
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     H2: Individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms will exhibit 
slower disengagement from disgust to neutral faces.  
     H3: Individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD will evidence the greatest 
difficulty disengaging their attention from sad and disgust stimuli.  
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CHAPTER IV 
METHODS 
 
 
4.1 Participants 
No study to date has examined differences between groups with elevated MDD 
and/or SAD symptoms with respect to their ability to disengage from disorder-specific 
stimuli.  Therefore, we based our power analysis on feasibility of recruiting a sample of 
affected participants based on logistic constraints. Our sensitivity analysis showed that a 
sample of N=45 is sufficient to a detect small-to-medium effect size (f =.25) across study 
hypothesis at a power = .80 and an α=.05.  
Participants were recruited from Cleveland State University’s undergraduate 
students enrolled in Introduction to Psychology (PSY 101), whereby these participants 
would receive research credit for their participation in the study, in partial fulfillment of 
the course. The sample consisted of 103 undergraduate students attending Cleveland 
State University and community participants, with 51% female. This sample’s (N=103) 
eye-tracking data was then identified as either trackable or untrackable, leading to an 
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overall usable sample size of N=98. The subjects were all adults (Mage = 22.85) and 
primarily Caucasian (67%). The remainder of the racial composition was as follows: 
African American (23%), Latino (5%), and Other (3.9%).  
4.2 Measures 
 4.2.1 Demographics 
Participants completed a brief survey that assessed basic demographic 
information such as age, sex, and racial background. 
 4.2.2 Major Depressive Disorder Scale 
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale (CES-D) is a 20-
item scale measuring depressive symptoms in the general population (Radloff, 
1977). Participants made responses on a 4-point Likert scale to such prompts as “I 
was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.” Prior research demonstrated 
the CES-D to be a reliable and valid measure of depression (α > .85) (Hann, 
Winter, & Jacobsen, 1999; Radloff, 1977). 
4.2.3 Social Anxiety Disorder Scale 
 The Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) contains 20 items which are 
rated from 0 (not at all characteristic or true of me) to 4 (extremely characteristic 
or true of me). Items are self-statements describing one's typical cognitive, 
affective, or behavioral reaction to a variety of situations requiring social 
interaction in dyads or groups (e.g., going to a party, talking to an attractive 
member of the opposite gender, expressing one's feelings). The SIAS was scored 
by summing the ratings (after reversing the 3 positively-worded items), and total 
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scores range from 0 to 80. Higher scores represented higher levels of social 
interactional anxiety (Mattick & Clarke, 1989). 
4.2.4 Eye-tracking Measures 
Participants viewed pictorial face pairs that comprised emotional and 
neutral expressions from the same individual. Faces were taken from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces (KDEF) database (Lundqvisk, Flykt, & 
Öhman, 1998). Based on a similar design from Sanchez et al. (2013), KDEF 
frontal view pictures that displayed discrete expressions of happiness, disgust, and 
sadness were used. The emotional faces were chosen based on the (1) specificity 
of the emotion being portrayed and (2) being of equal intensity across the three 
emotion categories. A total of 24 happy, 24 sad, and 24 disgust face stimuli (12 
men and 12 women for each emotion category, along with each actor’s neutral 
expression stimulus) were utilized for the eye tracking (ET) tasks. 
4.3 Experimental Protocol 
4.3.1 Design 
The ET task consisted of 72 trials (24 happy-neutral, 24 sad-neutral, and 
24 disgust-neutral pairs). Emotional and neutral faces were equally presented on 
the left and right side of the screen across trials. The main experiment was 
preceded by two practice trials to orient participants to the task.  The experimental 
design was similar to the one used in Sanchez et al. (2013). More specifically, 
each trial of the ET task started with a black screen for 500 ms, followed by a 
fixation cross in the middle of the screen for another 500 ms. A single, random 
digit (i.e., 1-9) replaced the fixation cross and remained on the screen for 1,000 
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ms; participants were instructed to say this number aloud so as to ensure their 
attention was oriented to the center of the screen prior to the presentation of the 
face pairs. Immediately after the digit offset, a pair of faces were presented on the 
screen for 3,000 ms. Participants were instructed to view these faces naturally, as 
if at home watching television. During this free-viewing period, indices of 
naturalistic stimulus processing assessed the following: initial orienting, fixation 
frequency and fixation percentage bias score. 
The engagement-disengagement task followed the free-viewing period. 
This task was comprised of three conditions: one-third of the trials assessed 
attentional engagement with the emotional face in the pair; one-third of the trials 
assessed where participants disengaged from the emotional face and engaged with 
the neutral face in the presented pair; and one-third are “control trials.” The 
control trials consisted of a free-viewing task and were followed by a fixation 
cross denoting the next trial. For the emotional engagement trials, after the 3,000-
ms free-viewing period, the face pair remained on the screen until the participant 
fixated on the neutral face; this was referred to as the “wait for fixation” period. 
Once a fixation was deployed onto the neutral face for at least 100 ms, stimulus 
presentation continued and a rectangular or oval frame encompassed the 
emotional face. Participants were instructed to shift their gaze as quickly as 
possible toward the frame and indicate the shape by pressing one of two keys on a 
keyboard corresponding to “rectangle” or “oval.” This engagement condition 
measured how long participants took to disengage attention from the neutral face 
and engage with the emotional face. For the disengagement trials, a similar 
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procedure was used. However, instead of having participants fixate toward the 
neutral face during the “wait for fixation” period, the trial proceeded once a 
fixation was deployed to the emotional face in the pair. Furthermore, after initial 
fixation to the emotional face, the rectangle or oval frame surrounded the neutral 
face. Thus, disengagement was determined by the amount of time needed to shift 
gaze from the emotional face toward the neutral face. All three trial conditions 
were randomly presented, and both types of frames were equal in their 
presentation and whether or not they appeared in the left and right positions 
during the engagement and disengagement conditions.  
4.3.2 Eye-tracking apparatus 
Eye movements are recorded using a Sensomotoric Instruments (SMI) 
RED250 (N=41) or a Tobii-branded 3X-120 (N=57) mobile eye tracking unit. 
Each participant’s eye position to the stimulus monitor was captured from an 
infrared light that is sent, via a camera, to the participant’s eyes, and gaze position 
at any given time was determined by the eye acting as a “retro-reflector,” 
extrapolating eye position from pupil illumination and reflection off of the cornea. 
Pupil reflection moved with the eye so as to determine the “center” of the eye at 
all times; corneal reflection remained fixed so as to be used as an anchor point for 
the head with respect to the infrared camera. Both eye tracking systems provided 
a 120 Hz measure of eye-gaze position, while both stimulus presentation and eye 
movement recording were conducted using SMI Experiment Center software. 
Visual fixations were defined as gaze resting within 0.5-1.0° visual angle for at 
least 100 ms (Manor & Gordon, 2003) within pre-determined areas of interest 
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(AOIs). AOIs comprised the entirety of the facial stimuli for both the free-
viewing and engage-disengage tasks; a “target” AOI encompassed the non-frame 
facial image during the “wait for fixation” trials. Once a definable, 100-ms 
fixation was recorded within this AOI, the engagement-disengagement task 
commenced. 
4.4 Analytic Plan 
     Following data collection, all statistical analyses were completed using IBM SPSS 
Statistics software (IBM, Inc., 2013). Descriptive statistics, including range, mean, and 
standard deviations were calculated, and correlations were performed. Symptom groups 
were created based on previously validated cut-offs on the CES-D and the SIAS. A score 
of 20 or greater has been determined to be the threshold for “high depression” criteria on 
the CES-D (Hann, Winter, & Jacobsen, 1999; Radloff, 1977), while a score of 34 or 
greater was determined to be the threshold for “high social anxiety” criteria (Mattick & 
Clarke, 1989). Despite efforts to oversample for social anxiety, only three groups 
emerged based on the above noted criteria:  a control group (N=66), a high depression 
group (N=21), and a high depression and high social anxiety group (N=11). 
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CHAPTER V 
RESULTS 
 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Bivariate correlations are presented in Table IV. Pearson correlations were 
conducted to examine bivariate correlations between all study variables. Age and sex 
were found to be uncorrelated with SIAS scores, CES-D scores, and disengagement from 
sad or disgust stimuli and thus were not entered as potential covariates in analyses.  
 Age and gender negatively correlated with one another, r=-.26, p<.01, which is 
indicative of younger participants being male, while older participants were female. As 
predicted, CES-D scores correlated with disengagement from sad stimuli, r=.29, p<.05, 
indicating a longer disengagement times from sad stimuli was associated with elevated 
depression symptoms.  
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 Intriguingly, disengagement times from sad stimuli positively correlated with disgust 
stimuli, r=.63, p<.01, indicating that individuals who took longer to disengagement from 
one negative valenced stimuli also took longer to disengage from the other negative 
valenced stimuli. It should be noted that these correlations consist of the control group, 
high MDD participants, and high MDD and high SAD participants.  
5.2 Hypotheses Testing  
  H1: Individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms will show 
a difficulty disengaging from sad to neutral faces.  
The first aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms when presented with 
a sad to neutral face sequence. Per the hypothesis, a repeated measure ANOVA in which 
the within-subject factor was the stimulus type (disgust vs. sad faces) and the between-
subject factor was disorder group membership based on symptom levels (control group, 
high MDD, or high MDD & high SAD) revealed no significant differences in stimulus 
types as a function of elevated MDD, SAD or MDD and SAD symptoms, F(2, 92) =1.36, 
p=.262, η2=.029. Follow up analyses revealed that participants who were classified as 
high MDD on average did not vary in disengagement from sad stimuli time (M= 250.22, 
SD= 72.98) when compared to the control group (M=247.36, SD= 68.52).  
H2: Individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms will exhibit slower 
disengagement from disgust faces.  
The second aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals’ elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms when presented with a 
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disgust to neutral face sequence. Due to study limitations and demographics, a sample 
that consisted of elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms was not attained and 
was thus not analyzed.  
H3: Individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD and SAD will evidence the 
greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both stimulus types.  
The third aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated SAD and elevated MDD symptoms when presented with both 
sad and disgust stimuli. The aim of this testing was to predict disengagement times from 
sad and disgust stimuli relevant to SAD and MDD symptomology. 
The repeated measures ANOVA examined group differences in their ability to 
disengage from disorder-specific stimuli failed to show group differences, F(2, 92) =1.36, 
p=.26, η2=.03. This finding is indicative of controls, participants high in MDD, and 
participants high in MDD and SAD do not differ significantly in disengagement time 
from sad or disgust stimuli. It can then be hypothesized that regardless of individuals 
specific diagnostic groups, disengagement practices were not impacted by elevated social 
anxiety or depressive symptoms. Although statistical significance was not observed 
between controls, the elevated depressive group, and the elevated depressive and anxious 
group, and stimuli types (sad and disgust faces), the main effect of being exposed to a 
specific stimuli demonstrated a trend-level difference F(1, 92) = 3.79, p=.06, η2=.04.  
This finding suggests a trend for longer disengagement times in response to sad relative 
to disgust faces.  
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
With the high prevalence of comorbid social anxiety and depression diagnoses, it 
was imperative to understand the link between cognitive risk and maintenance factors of 
both social anxiety and major depressive disorder symptoms, leading to a potential 
identification of delivering existing treatments more effectively. The present study 
examined disengagement practices from negatively valenced stimuli, namely sad and 
disgusted faces. Specifically, it examined the relationship between the symptomology of 
social anxiety disorder, major depressive disorder, and participants’ disengagement times 
after viewing disorder-specific stimuli.  
As a result of a limited sample of participants who experienced low MDD and 
high SAD symptomology, three groups were created for data analysis. The first group 
consisted of control participants who did not score highly on either the CES-D scale or 
the SIAS scale. The second group consisted of participants who scored highly on the 
CES-D but did not score highly on the SIAS. The third group consisted of participants 
who scored highly on both the CES-D and the SIAS. Although these three groups, with 
an increase in participant size, could have given way to a true interaction study, 
participant sample numbers were not great enough to analyze a true interaction 
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experience. As such, these three groups were then analyzed with their respective 
disengagement times from negatively valenced stimuli exhibiting either a sad face or a 
disgust face.  
The first aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated MDD symptoms and low SAD symptoms when presented with 
a sad to neutral face disengagement sequence. It was hypothesized that these individuals 
would demonstrate difficulty disengaging from a sad face towards a neutral face. As 
research conducted by Joorman and Gotlib (2007) has demonstrated, depressed 
individuals present with difficulty disengaging from stimuli that is emotionally relevant 
to themselves. This study examined how a negatively valenced stimuli would impact the 
disengagement practices in depressed individuals. The overall goal of this hypothesis was 
to expand upon further research by incorporating sad and disgust stimuli to participants 
who scored highly on the CES-D.   
Individuals with depression have been observed to use schemas to exhibit a 
systematic bias in the processing of their environmental stimuli or information that is 
relevant to their current symptomology. As a result of this attentional bias, depressed 
individuals have been observed attending selectively to negative stimuli in their 
environment and interpreting neutral and ambiguous stimuli in a schema-congruent way 
(Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). The first aim of this study was to confirm if this attentional 
bias was observed in our sample of participants.  
Literature to date suggests that individuals with high MDD symptomology should 
demonstrate longer times to disengage from sad stimuli (Sanchez, Romero, & De Raedt, 
2017). Interestingly, individuals in our sample who reported high depressive symptoms 
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(scores greater than or equal to 20 on the CES-D) did not show a difference in 
disengagement practices when compared to the control group of participants. Indeed, this 
is consistent with the current eye-tracking literature, which discussed mixed results 
among studies. As demonstrated by Gotlib and colleagues (Gotlib, Kasch, et al., 2004; 
Gotlib, Krasnoperova, et al., 2004; Joormann & Gotlib, 2007), clinically depressed 
participants exhibited an attentional bias toward sad faces. In contrast, Rinck & Becker 
(2005) failed to show attentional biases among depressed participants who were exposed 
to negatively valenced words, and Mogg et al. (1995) failed to show an attentional bias 
among depressed participants when these participants were exposed to negatively 
valenced faces.  However, individuals who reported high depressive symptomology and 
low social anxiety symptomology disengaged faster from the sad stimuli when compared 
to the combination group of high social anxiety and high depressive symptomology 
individuals. Again, this is contradictory to the current literature as it was expected for the 
depressive-symptomatic group to exhibit longer disengagement times from symptom-
specific stimuli, such as sad faces. In a series of studies by Gotlib and Joormann (2010), 
participants who were experiencing a depressive episode demonstrated longer 
disengagement times when exposed to negatively valenced stimuli that was congruent to 
their depressive symptomology. Similarly, research conducted by Sanchez and colleagues 
(2013) evidenced that depressed participants demonstrated a difficulty with disengaging 
visual attention away from sad faces. One potential explanation for this observed 
correlation rests in the notion that individuals suffering from comorbid depression and 
social anxiety symptoms could take longer to disengage from any type of negatively 
valenced stimuli, regardless if it resonates with the individual’s symptomology.  
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The second aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated SAD symptoms and low MDD symptoms. It was hypothesized 
that these individuals would exhibit slower disengagement from the presented faces. 
Cognitive theories of SAD posit that the main process of SAD is self-directed attention 
triggered by social situations, with a corresponding withdrawal of adaptive attention to 
positive external cues (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Current 
evidence suggests that SAD will increase attentional threat biases. Studies have supported 
this assumption by showing that individuals with a high level of social anxiety tend to 
display an attentional bias towards external threats, and a greater likelihood of favoring 
the threatening meaning of ambiguous cues (Peschard & Philippot, 2015). Thus, it would 
be expected to observe slower disengagement times in individuals with SAD 
symptomology when they are presented with the disgust stimuli. Due to the small amount 
of participants who scored highly on the SIAS (equal to or above a 34 for social anxiety 
indication) and with the understanding that these high scoring SIAS individuals also 
presented with high levels of MDD on the CES-D (equal to or above 20 for major 
depressive disorder indication), this aim was not able to be analyzed. Given the current 
study and its present findings, one would hypothesize that with a larger sample of strictly 
socially anxious individuals, these individuals would demonstrate slower disengagement 
times from disgust stimuli.  
The third aim of the study sought to understand disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated SAD and MDD symptoms when presented with both sad and 
disgust stimuli. It was hypothesized that individuals with elevated symptoms of MDD 
and SAD would evidence the greatest difficulty disengaging their attention from both 
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stimulus types. Given the previous research on attentional bias in individuals with MDD 
and SAD, it was expected that these participants will demonstrate the longest amount of 
time to disengage from both stimuli, as cognitive models of both disorders posit 
disengagement difficulties.  
Across the three groups, a trend emerged that participants in general tended to 
disengage faster from the disgust stimuli, but did not demonstrate a significant change 
when participants were presented with the sad stimuli. Additionally, individuals with 
high social anxiety and high depressive symptomology were slower to disengage 
regardless of the negative stimuli presented to them when compared to the control group. 
This could be explained due to a hallmark feature of socially anxious individuals is that 
they are constantly searching out feedback from their peers, thus these negative valenced 
stimuli resonate with their symptomology, eliciting a longer disengagement time from the 
presented stimuli.  
One interesting aspect of disengagement practices arose with group 3, which 
consisted of individuals with both high social anxiety symptomology and high depressive 
symptomology (N=11). When looking at disengagement practices, the presence of social 
anxiety inhibited disengagement from both sad and disgust stimuli, leading to an overall 
longer average time to disengage from presented stimuli. This could be explained by the 
cognitive model of socially anxious individuals, with SAD being associated with quick 
detection and immediate attention to relevant stimuli, even when stimuli are presented 
subliminally (LeMoult, Yoon, & Joormann, 2012b). Thus, if socially anxious individuals 
engage with stimuli that are either judgmental, threatening, or offering a type of negative 
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feedback, they will first engage with the negative stimuli and then take longer to divert 
their gaze to from the negative stimuli to the neutral stimuli.  
However, the mean difference between our high CES-D and high SIAS group and 
our control group was not significant, with an approximate difference between the two 
groups at 63 ms. This practice was not observed in the depression-only group, which 
indicated that the disengagement from sad and disgust stimuli is specific to individuals 
with depression coupled with social anxiety.  
As such, individuals with high CES-D scores demonstrated disengagement from 
sad faces on average M=250.22 ms., and demonstrated disengagement from disgust faces 
on average M=224.78 ms. Contrary to our hypothesis, no mean differences were 
discerned when comparing our control group’s average sad stimuli disengagement time 
to our high depression sad stimuli disengagement time (M=250.22, SD=72.98). 
Additionally, no discernable differences between disgust disengagement times were 
observed between the elevated MDD group and our control group.  
6.1 Limitations 
 The findings for this study should be considered with several limitations. First, the 
sample for this study was comprised of an undergraduates and community sample, which 
limits the ability to generalize the findings from this study to clinical populations. 
Second, data collection was varied between two different laboratory settings utilizing two 
different branded eye-trackers. Out of 103 participants, 42 participants were exposed to 
the SMI eye-tracker, while the remainder of the participants were exposed to the Tobii 
eye-tracking system. Thus, it is unclear if this mechanical difference impacted 
disengagement times from sad and disgust stimuli. The most glaring limitation of this 
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study was lack of participants suffering from social anxiety symptomology without 
complementary depressive symptomology to fulfill the original study hypothesis. The 
main aim of our study was to further understand the disengagement practices of 
individuals with elevated social anxiety symptoms. Without a sample of strictly socially 
anxious individuals, this study was unable to further the literature regarding 
disengagement practices and disordered-specific stimuli and their relationship to social 
anxiety. Without a larger sample of strictly socially anxious individuals, the study is not 
generalizable to clinical populations, and cannot help to further identify cognitive risk 
factors or improve upon therapeutic delivery techniques.  
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research 
 The design of this study reveals several limitations that could be addressed in 
future research. The first is recruiting a clinical population sample in hopes of examining 
the clinical implications of eye-tracking. The second is recruiting individuals who are 
suffering from social anxiety without a depression component. This would allow study 
results to be generalizable to socially anxious populations, potentially leading to revised 
delivery of treatments. Lastly, there is room to explore additional stimuli that might cause 
increased disengagement times in socially anxious and depressed individuals.   
6.3 Strengths and Clinical Implications 
 The present study was able to examine a novel addition to the present literature. 
Although it has been well researched that individuals with high depressive 
symptomology will demonstrate an attentional bias towards negatively valenced stimuli, 
specifically sad faces, we were unable to confirm this attentional bias. The elevated MDD 
participants did not demonstrate considerable differences in attentional bias towards 
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specific stimuli when compared to our control group. A second novel finding that would 
add to the present literature involves the disengagement practices of individuals with both 
elevated SAD and MDD. These individuals demonstrated an overlap of disengagement 
practices by exhibiting a significantly longer time to direct their attention away from both 
sad and disgust stimuli.  This finding, if replicated with a clinical population, can add to 
the plethora of therapy deliverance techniques with regards to individuals who are 
diagnosed with both SAD and MDD.   
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Table II. Means and standard deviations of study variables 
 
 
 
Measure Mean Standard Deviation 
Age 22.85 8.89 
SIAS score 35.49 16.29 
CES-D score 16.71 11.66 
Disengagement Sad (MS) overall 255.06 84.42 
Disengagement Disgust (MS) overall 244.31 83.82 
Disengagement Sad  
Control Group 
247.36 68.52 
Disengagement Sad 
 High CES-D 
250.22 72.98 
Disengagement Sad 
 High CES-D and High SIAS 
310.50 155.35 
Disengagement Disgust Control Group 245.29 83.64 
Disengagement Disgust High CES-D 224.78 56.95 
Disengagement Disgust High CES-D and High SIAS 275.66 119.57 
Note. Social anxiety was measured using the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; threshold 
for social anxiety is equal to or above 34); depression was measured using the Center for 
Epidemiological Study, Depression scale (CES-D; threshold for depression is equal to or above 
20); disengagement sad and disgust were measured in milliseconds.  
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Table III. Demographic Characteristics 
Characteristic 
Study Sample 
N = 103 (%) 
Gender 
     Female 
     Male 
 
50.5 
49.5 
Age 
     18-29 
     30-44 
     45-63 
 
87.2 
6.9 
4.9 
Race 
     African American 
     Caucasian 
     East Asian 
     Latino 
     Native American 
     Other 
     Pacific Islander 
     South Asian 
 
23.3 
67.0 
0.0 
4.9 
0.0 
3.9 
0.0 
1.0 
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APPENDIX B 
1. Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS) 
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2. Center for Epidemiological Studies—Depression Scale (CES-D)
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APPENDIX C 
Eye tracking Stimuli 
Male Disgusted with frame Female Disgusted without 
frame 
Female Sad with frame Male Sad without frame 
